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NOTE
BRANCH BANKING IN COLORADO

A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
INTRODUCTION

the United States there are 14,000
W ITHIN
banks operated within a single structure

unit banks of which 85
percent have less than $25 million in deposits.' There are 7,700
-

communities with only a single unit bank and 1,800 towns with

only two unit banks. 2 Excluding branches, 75 percent of the
country's chartered banks are in one-bank or two-bank commu-

nities. Only one out of 10 of these unit banks serves over 5,000
people, and half serve populations of less than 1,000. In contrast,
the nation's commercial banks permitted to have branches are
located in 29,300 structures with each location serving an
average of 6,700 people.
With the sole exception of Wyoming,' all of the states
and the District of Columbia have legislated with respect to
branch banking. Regulatory schemes vary widely, permitting
state-wide branching,4 allowing branches within the county
where the main office is located and in counties contiguous to
that county,' authorizing branches only in the county in which
the head office is located,'! and prohibiting the operation of

1Rose, Are Those 11,400 Banks Really Necessary?, FORTUNE, Nov. 1970,

at 113.
2 Bratter, The Role of Branch Banking in Area Development, 1 MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS (THE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE VENTURE)

87, 88 (1966).

3 E. HALAAS, THE BANKING STRUCTURE IN COLORADO 22 (1969).
4 Such states include: Alas., Ariz., Cal., Conn., Del., D.C., Hawaii, Idaho,
Me., Md., Nev., N.C., Ore., R.I., S.C., Utah, and Wash. E. HALAAS, supra
note 3, at 22. South Dakota has changed its law to allow all present
branches to continue, but new branches must be the result of a merger
with an established facility. See South Dakota Section, POLK's BANK
DIRECTORY (1971).

, Those states which allow branches in the county where the main office
is located and all counties contiguous to that county are: Miss. (100
mile limit), Mich. (25 mile limit), N.M. (100 mile limit), Ohio, Penn.,
and Wis. (25 mile limit). New York and New Jersey allow expansion
within prescribed banking "districts," and Louisiana banks may branch
in contiguous counties

or

"parishes."

Those

states which

refer to

branches as "offices" and allow them in the head office county and contiguous counties are: Ark., Iowa, and N.D. Gup, A Review of State
Laws on Branch Banking, 88 BANKING L.J. 675, 682 (1971).
6 States which allow branching within the county where the main office
is located include: Ala., Ind., Ky., Mass., Tenn., Utah, and Va. E. HALAAS,
supra note 3, at 22. New Hampshire allows branches to exist in the
same city as the head office (plus 30 miles), and Georgia limits its
branches to the same city. Gup, supra note 5, at 682.
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branch banking completely.7 The Colorado scheme" fits most
reasonably in the final category of complete prohibition. 9
This diversity in the regulation of state banking is evidence
of the continuing controversy over the values and dangers of
branch banking. The purpose of this note is to analyze present
restrictions on branch banking in light of their origins and appropriateness in today's banking environment. The approach
taken gives general consideration to the traditional arguments
which both justify and refute the need for branch banking
regulations. Since the federal government sought to provide a
balance in the dual federal-state banking law through the McFadden Act, 10 member banks of the national banking system
may not exceed any branch banking restriction created by state
law. 1 Consequently, state law will be the primary focus of this
note, with specific consideration being given to the Colorado
restrictions.
I. COLORADO BANKS AND BRANCH BANKING LAW
2
Branch banking has always been prohibited in Colorado.'
In 1911 the Colorado legislature passed the present branch banking statute which provides that "every bank shall be conducted
at a single place of business and no branch thereof shall be
maintained elsewhere.' 3 In 1969, the legislature enacted an
exception to this restriction by authorizing banks, after approval
by the State Banking Board, to operate one detached facility
for receipt of deposits, cashing of checks, and delivery of cash
within 2,000 feet of their main office.' 4 These limitations apply
solely to commercial banks and impose no restrictions on savings and loan associations.
Significantly, the application of the statutory prohibition
against branch banking has been limited by the Colorado
Supreme Court which has required the presence of the unitary
type of operation characteristic of a branch bank for the restric7 Those states which absolutely prohibit branching are: Colo., Fla., Ill.,

Kan., Minn., Mo., Mont., Neb., Okla., Tex., W. Va. E. IIALAAS, supra
note 3, at 22.
8 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-1 (Supp. 1969), amending COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-1 (1963).
" It should be noted that a recent amendment to the Colorado statute
permits the establishment of branches within 2,000 feet of a parent bank.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-1 (Supp. 1969).
10 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 29, 34a, 36, 51, 52, 57, 72, 76, 81, 82, 84, 161, 321, 342,
371, 501, 521, 591, 593 (1970).
11 McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
12 Ch. 19, § 68, [1877] Colo. Sess. Laws 166.
13CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-1 (Supp. 1969), amending COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-1 (1963).
14
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-1 (Supp. 1969).
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tion to apply.' 5 This judicial requirement of unitary operation
departed from the view held by the Colorado State Bank Commissioner who had argued that chain banking- the operation
of several banks owned by a holding company- was with within the interdiction of branch banking. 16 The effect of the court's
decision was to limit the statute to commercial banks maintaining "extensions" which are an integral part of the main
office's operation- the essence of a unitary type of operation.
All other methods used by banking institutions are not subject
17
to the statutory prohibition.
The prohibition of branching raises issues with respect to
the adequacy of service for Colorado citizens which should be
kept in mind in an evaluation of the appropriateness of Colorado's anti-branching statute. Colorado has 80 one-bank towns,
with an average population of 1,800, which are not near larger
metropolitan communities. These small town banks are available to serve 20 percent of the state's population, constitute 37
percent of the state's banks, and account for only 9 percent of
the total state bank deposits.' 8 It is interesting to note that the
unit banks, presently serving a significant segment of Colorado's population, have a disproportionately small percentage of
Colorado's total bank assets.
II.

HISTORICAL

RATIONALES FOR BRANCH

BANKING PROHIBITIONS

The reasons for branch banking prohibitions are varied and
conflicting. One fact, however, does seem clear: branch banking restrictions are an almost unique American phenomenon.
English law permits completely uninhibited branching of
banks,19 as do the laws of most other countries.20 To account for
America's singular treatment of the banking industry, it is
necessary to understand a number of factors in early American
banking history.
During the early part of the nineteenth century, most of
the branch banks in the Eastern States were replaced by
smaller, independent banks in. response to restrictive legisla15 Peoples Bank v. Banking Board, 164 Colo. 565, 571, 436 P.2d 681 (1968),
citing First Nat'l Bank v. First Bank Stock Corp., 306 F.2d 937, 943 (9th
Cir. 1962).
16 Goldy v. Crane, 167 Colo. 44, 47, 445 P.2d 212, 213 (1968).
17 Group and chain banks are owned by the same person or group, but
avoid the "unitary type of operation" by operating each bank as an
individual entity with its own officers and directors and by not intermingling funds or services with their affiliate members. E. HALAAS,
supra note 3, at 21, 24, 103, 105.
18 Id. at 100.
19 Halleck, Freedom in Banking, 31 BANKING L.J. 870, 871 (1914).
20

E.

HALAAS,

supra note 3, at 18.
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tion. 2 1 This legislation was not aimed at branch banking per
se, but rather at the issuance of so-called "wild cat" currency.
This problem was resolved when the Bank Act of 1865 drove
circulating notes of state banks out of existence by the imposition of a 10 percent tax. 22 After this Act, most state banks were
converted into individual national banks.
Although note issuance was a major factor in prompting
anti-branching regulations, there were other difficulties which
attended the operation of branch banks. The Second Bank of
the United States met with grave difficulties of supervision in
the 1860's when "[p]oor roads and transporation systems made
it almost impossible for auditors or officers from the head office
to check the work in the several branches.12 3 Further investigation into this communication problem reveals that many early
regulations were predicated upon the reasoning that when the
steadying influence of ever-present bank officers was absent,
security of deposits was lessened and probability of loss was
24
increased.
That this concern for the safety of deposits was justified
is illustrated by a 1910 Colorado case, Kipp v. Miller,25 which
dealt with the dissolution of the State Bank of Monta Vista
which had operated two highly profitable branches in Creede
and Garrison for 10 years. The dissolution caused creditors, who
had dealt in good faith with the branches as part of the state
bank, to bring suit against the stockholders who had shared in
profits from the branches. The defense of an ultra vires act was
raised since branches were prohibited, but the shareholders
were estopped on the ground that they had acquiesced in a relationship of which they were well aware. 26 "[G]eneral publicity was given to the relations between these branch banks
and the State Bank ....
[L]etterheads of the branches bore the
legend that they were associated with the State Bank ...
[I]ndeed their relations seem to have been a matter of common
'27
knowledge.
It is obvious from a reading of Kipp that the regulatory
system at that time was indifferent to the branching issue, since
the branches had been allowed to go unregulated for 10 years
and the suit arose only when creditors, following the failure of
21

G.

22 J.

CARTHINHOUR,

BRANCH, GROUP AND

CHAPMAN, CONCENTRATION

Id. at 94.
50 A.L.R. 1340, 1342 (1927).
25 47 Colo. 598, 108 P. 164 (1910).
26 Id. at 607, 108 P. at 167.
27 Id. at 605-06, 108 P. at 167.
23

24

CHAIN BANKING

OF BANKING

14 (1934).

278 (1931).

BRANCH BANKING

the parent bank, sued to enforce the liability of stockholders.
Therefore, the concern for stability, plus the possibility of
cumulative failure in such unrestricted situations as that presented in Kipp, may be the best explanation for the 1911 statute
which regulates Colorado branch banking today. Evidence of
this can be found in a letter dated January 16, 1908, from the
Assistant Attorney General of Colorado, S. H. Thompson, Jr.,
to the Colorado State Bank Commissioner, Harry M. Beatty: "It
is evident that the purpose of the legislature in prohibiting
branch banks was to avoid the dangers which might follow
from the temptation to transfer the funds of one branch to another and thus impair the financial conditions of the various
28
branches."
During the late nineteenth century the national banking
system, in an effort to afford safe banking facilities, became
very inflexible; as a result, money panics occurred in 1873, 1893,
and 1907.2) During these difficult times branch banking was
discussed as a means of relieving the problem of small communities without banking facilities; but legislatures did not
"contemplate encouraging [the location of banks in] unduly
places that could not support unit banking. ' 30 In 1904, John
Hamlin, Attorney General of Illinois, stated that branch banking
would promote uncertainty and "increase the liabilities of banks
in proportion to capital stock, and encourage an extension of
business,"' ' 1 which he considered detrimental to bank safety and
against sound public policy.
Another factor which prompted anti-branching legislation
was the desire to control the influence of "big money." In 1887
the Comptroller of Currency, William L. Trenholm, voiced the
often repeated fear that an extension of branch banking would
mean money monopoly.32 The fear of monopoly has been often
forwarded as an explanation for the ban on branching:
"[A]merican (and especially rural American) fear of 'foreign'
money power, and the desire to keep local banking resources
' '3
in local hands, are probable explanations for this prohibition.
Perhaps the most emotional advocate of branching prohibitions was the 1907 Bank Commissioner of Wisconsin, Marcus C.
28
29

1907-08 COLO. ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 156.
Halleck, Our Banking System, 19 CASE & COM. 414 (1912).

30 28

L.J. 15 (1911).
BANKING L.J. 673, 674 (1904).
J. CHAPMAN, supra note 22, at 111.
Kreps, Modernizing Banking Regulation, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., 648,
657 (1967).

3121

32
33

BANKING
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Bergh, who described branches as being "foreign to the American principle of free banking and contrary to the spirit and
'' 4
intent of the Wisconsin banking law. 13 This "un-American"
characterization has been constantly used by later advocates
of anti-branching legislation, but the allegation is never accompanied by a detailed explanation of its basis. Bergh also gave
a more practical explanation of the previously mentioned communications problem by pointing out that branches would
require the state to employ several examiners at one time to
simultaneously examine the main bank and its branches. This
point may be a factor often overlooked in attempting to analyze
early legislative concerns over the difficulties accompanying
branch banking.
Another historical argument against branching was that
early taxes were structured in such a fashion that if branches
35
replaced unit banks, the local community would lose taxes.
Thus, there existed a local incentive to prohibit branches. A
further local argument against branches contended that a
branch, governed by strict rules and regulations from the main
office, would leave few decisions to the manager's discretion.
Consequently, it would be difficult for a young man, or a local
infant industry, with little capital to secure credit from a
36
branch.
III. THE

CURRENT APPLICABILITY OF THE HISTORICAL RATIONALE
FOR THE PROHIBITION

OF BRANCH BANKING

Based on the foregoing, the historical rationale for the prohibition of branch banking can be separated into five main categories: inadequate communications, lack of stability, management incompetency, lack of local control, and miscellaneous
dangers. It is important to examine these historical rationales
from the viewpoint of modern banking practices and the
present situation in the banking industry.
A.

Communications

A detailed examination of the change in communications
systems since 1911 is not necessary to conclude that the communication problem, a substantial factor in past anti-branching
legislation, has long since been solved. Auditors and examiners
no longer encounter difficulty in getting to branches. This outdated argument was aptly dismissed in 1966 by George W.
Mitchell, a Federal Reserve Board Governor, who "envisions the
34 Branches of Banks & Trust Companies, 24 BANKING L.J. 166 (1907).
35 V. WILLIT, CHAIN, GROUP, AND BRANCH BANKING 176 (1930).
36 Id. at 43.
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advancement of automation to a point that not only will permit,
but will force, profound changes in banking structure."3 7 He
further points out that computers will soon make it possible
to avoid outmoded banking restrictions and that some banks
38
have already done so through the mail service.
B.

Stability

The stability concern, like the communications issue, has
completely changed in its characteristics. It is now well accepted that: "[T]here is little question but that a powerful
branch organization offers a greater protection as a repository
of funds than does the small independent institution. '39 Onesixth of all banks existing in 1920 failed by 1928. 411Figures from
post World War II to 1966 show that an average of only five
banks, or .04 percent of the total number of banks, fail each
year. 41 This rate is so low it has prompted Representative
Patman, Chairman of House Banking and Currency Committee,
to remark that there are not enough bank failures. He indicates
that, unlike the situation in 1899, the market today is not sufficiently competitive and that if more competition existed consumers would benefit. 4 - He further points out: "When we boast
of no bank failures, let's remember that several thousand other
business firms may have failed because the banks did not take
43
as many reasonable risks as they might have taken.
Management Competency
The fear of poor management stems from an apprehension
that branches could carry on the same business as the main
institution "without being subject. to safeguards afforded the
establishment and administration of the latter. '44 Today, due
mainly to the increase in communication technology, branches
may be easily regulated and protected by the head office's
"administration" and "safeguards." The fear of not having the
president ever-present has therefore been technically relieved.
However, there currently exists an argument which charges
that the complex managerial hierarchy moves all competent
C.

37

Quantius, Outmoded Aspects of Branch Banking Laws, 204 COM. & FIN.
CHRON. 9, 10 (Dec. 8, 1966).

38 Id.

39 G. CARTHINHOUR, supra note 21, at 308.
40 V. WIaLrr, supra note 35, at 108.
41

42
4:1

Edwards, Bank Mergers and the Public Interest: a Legal and Economic
Analysis of the 1966 Bank Merger Act, 85 BANKING L.J. 753, 783-84
(1968).
Davis, Banking Regulation Today: A Banker's View, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 639, 642 (1966).

Id.

44 50 A.L.R. 1340, 1343 (1927).
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managers to the main office, leaving local areas with managers
who have no ability to react to local problems. How wellfounded is this fear?
D. Feared Loss of Local Control
Fear of loss of local control is a bifurcated argument used
to justify the prohibition of branch banking. The first aspect
of the argument is that the local populace will not be able to
effectively influence "absentee" managers who make decisions
from the main office. This, it is asserted, will make loans difficult to obtain and subordinate local interests to those of "big
city" banks.
With respect to the impact of branching on the availability
of loans, it should be pointed out that "the smaller the bank,
the higher the ratio of sterile assets (cash) and government
securities to total resources. '45 Data indicates that banks with
deposits of 5 to 10 million dollars hold 35 percent of their assets
in liquidity reserves and 51.7 percent in loans and discounts.
The banks with 25 to 100 million in deposits hold 28.3 percent
in liquidity reserves and loan 54.9 percent. Institutions having
more than 100 million in deposits hold 27.6 percent in reserves
and loan 55.7 percent, while the very largest banks loan 75
percent of their deposits. 4" Thus it seems clear that instead
of making it more difficult for local people to obtain loans,
4
branching would actually have the opposite result.

7

The argument that community participation in local banks
benefits the community is equally unrealistic. A Federal Reserve Board study in 1962 showed that among banks with assets
of less than 5 million dollars (the 80 unit banks in single Colorado towns previously mentioned average assets of less than
3.3 million 41), 20 people or less owned 90 percent of the stock.
In most of these banks the controlling interest was held by
three stockholders. 4" Needless to say the interests of a small
group of stockholders do not always correspond to those of the
community.
An example of Coloradans "benefiting" from local autonomy was demonstrated in the 1963 case of Banking Board v.
Holyoke Industrial Bank. 0 The issue raised was: Did the fact
that the community had one bank preclude the need for an45 Rose, supra note 1, at 113.
46

Id.

47 Id. at 138.
48 E. HALAAS,

supra note 3, at 100.
49 Bratter, supra note 2, at 88.
50 152 Colo. 489, 383 P.2d 318 (1963).
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other? The Colorado Supreme Court overturned the banking
board's denial of a permit for a second bank when the record
revealed that the existent bank was a family organization whose
procedures included: in addition to a regular service charge,
the imposition of a "float charge" of 10 cents per $100 face value
for every check deposited which was drawn upon another bank;
paying 1 percent on savings accounts up to $10,000 with no
additional interest on accounts in excess of that amount; discouraging savings accounts; not handling consumer accounts;
limiting loans to $6,000; and making little effort to gain larger
loans for customers through correspondent banks.
The question of whose local interest is really being protected by unit banking is summarized by James Saxon, the
Comptroller of Currency from 1962 to 1966:
It is perfectly clear that [restrictive branch banking] laws show
little regard for the public interest, that they are designed to protect the selfish interests cf the less energetic or competent segments of the industry which cannot abide the prospect of competition. It is unfortunate that such laws do not meet the economic needs cf the people and of the industries, but
serve instead
the determined opposition of parochial interest.51

The second aspect of the feared loss of local control argument involves the belief that free competition among banks of
all sizes will bring about a money monopoly in the major banking centers and cause a depletion of bank assets at the local
level. This argument is based on speculation with respect to
what would happen to small unit banks if forced to compete
with big money branches. One answer is found in the Hearings
of the Committee on Banking and Currency where Mr. Saxon
acknowledged that, for many banking services, size confers no
advantage. Experience has shown that well-managed, adequately capitalized, aggressive small banks can and do prosper
when in competition with the country's largest institutions. "For
such banks, which rely upon their own efforts, and not upon
public protection against competition, there will always be a
'52
place in the banking structure.
Existence of larger banking institutions has not proven to
be detrimental to a competitive atmosphere. Studies have shown
"that the most competition, and the most aggressive competition,
typically occurs among the nation's relatively small number of
larger banks. '5 3 Indeed, these larger banks are competing, or
147,
150 (1962).
52 Hearings on the Conflict of Federal and State Banking Laws Before the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 374
(1963).
5 E. HALAAS, supra note 3, at 94, citing C. KRIEPs, MONEY, BANKING AND
MONETARY POLICY 199 (1962).
51 J. SAXON, 100TH ANNUAL REPORT OF COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY
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are at least willing to compete, with many of the smaller banks
throughout the nation. The extent to which these banks are
allowed to grow does not have to be regulated differently in
various states, since the Bank Holding Company Act and the
Bank Merger Act5 5 can now be relied upon as effective barriers to excessive concentration of banking at the state level. "
In any event, to allow Colorado's group and chain banking to
expand only through acquisition of established institutions is a
less rational alternative than to allow new branches to be
created as direct and local competitors to existing banks in
growing population areas.
It is often argued that economies of scale provide cost benefits which will allow branching institutions to monopolize the
industry. This argument is fallacious. Many studies conclude
that as the size of a bank increases, costs decline for unit banks
but increase for branch banks; 57 and, it has been shown that
branching results in higher costs for nearly all bank service.58
As for the magnitudes of these cost differences, a study by the
Commission of Money and Credit conducted on all member
banks of the Federal Reserve in 1959 found these differences to
be small but consistently higher for branches. 59 Another study
of unit and branch banks showed the cost of services for banks
with four or more branches to be higher by 9 percent of total
operating expenses.60 This belief in the creation of a monopoly
through the use of cost advantages is further contradicted by
California statistics which show that for the period 1961-66 the
number of branch banks increased 47 percent (California has
permitted branches for over 50 years),61 while the number of
unit banks rose 76 percent.6 2 Therefore, the fact that monopoly
is not created by allowing branch banking is demonstrated by
practical experience, as well as by cost studies.
This idea of prohibiting money monopoly advanced by the
proponents of anti-branch banking regulations has another and
12 U.S.C.A. § 1842 (Supp. 1972), amending 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842 (1969).
§ 1828(c) (1970).
56General Bankshares Corp., 53 FED. RES. BULL. 65 (1967); Wells Fargo
Bank, 52 FED. RES. BULL. 655 (1966).
57 D. ALHADEFF, MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION IN BANKING 83, 87-88 (1954).
58 Edwards, supra note 41, at 787.
59 Benston, Branch Banking and Economies of Scale, 20 J. FIN. 312, 328-29
(1965).
54

5512 U.S.C.

60 Id. at 330-31.

61 Bratter, supra note 2, at 93.
62

Id. One variable which enters these figures is that of the banks created
to establish viable operations and then sold for a capital gain either as
a branch or to a group holding or chain banking company. J. SAXON,
supra note 51, at 148-49.
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often untold aspect. The prohibition of branch banking, ostensibly intended to block a money monopoly, often gives the local
unit banker a mild form of local monopoly. The public is not
best served by these regulations which protect banks of a particular size; the consumer is more interested in the establishment of a banking system which effectively meets his needs.
The protection of perhaps undeserving interest is not a new
problem and is summarized by the late Senator Glass of Virginia, a member of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee for over 30 years:
The appeal of the little bank, so-called, against the "monopolistic" tendencies of branch-banking is misleading when we come
to reason about it. The fact is that the little banker is the monopolist. He wants to exclude credit facilities from any other
source than his bank. He wants to monopolize the credit accommodations of his community: He does not want any other bank
in his state to come there.63

A recent Colorado example of this practice of exclusion is
found in Banking Board v. Turner Industrial Bank,64 where the
main criteria for denial of a new charter by the Banking Board
was the existence of another bank in the area. In its decision,
the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the effect of a new
charter upon existing institutions should not be an issue when
a decision could be based upon advantages to the public and
their needs. Despite such recent recognition of public needs,
there is a better solution for the regulation of monopoly in the
banking industry than absolute branching prohibitions.
E.

Other Factors
The old fear of issuing notes and wild cat currency no
longer exists. Although there is little doubt that an original
motive for creating branches was to provide an outlet for notes
that could be redeemed only at the main office, thereby keeping
the notes in circulation for a longer period of time, the need for
such a favorable "float" situation is extinct. Moreover, there are
many other collateral issues, such as local taxes and increased
requirements for examiners, that must be exposed in order to
weigh the merits of branch banking accurately. These issues
indicate that motives exist for prohibiting branches which persuade the legislature not to adhere to an objective public benefit analysis.
Political considerations have always contributed input and
should be weighed appropriately in any evaluation of the bank63 Bratter, supra note 2, at 90.
64

165 Colo. 147, 155, 437 P.2d 531, 535 (1968).
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ing system. An interesting comment made as far back as 1924
illustrates this point: "While the economic arguments for branch
banking would logically lead to nation-wide branch banking as
it exists abroad, political considerations render the discussion
of such an extension purely theoretical at this time. '65 This idea
of branch banking policy being a mixture of both political and
economic forces holds true today. It is the political forces outside of the legal system which must be harnessed toward the
objective of serving the public benefit rather than being allowed to continue to favor pressure groups. Only after an
attitudinal change can the legal regulatory system prescribe
efficient laws which avoid circumvention (such as today's allowing group and chain banking) and either prohibit or allow
branch banking.
IV.

WHAT CAN BE GAINED BY ALLOWING BRANCH

BANKING?

Since the historical rationales for the prohibition of branch
banking are certainly subject to question, the benefits to be
derived from a change to allow branch banking should be examined. Also the questions should be asked: What have other
states which have changed their banking restrictions gained by
the change, and what does a continued prohibition of branch
banking cost the public?
A 1961 study conducted by the University of Chicago on
Illinois banking practices reveals facts which lead one to question the public benefit derived from a branching prohibition.
Illinois is a classic example of a state where unit banking has
prevailed in the face of pressures to change it. The study
termed Chicago the most "underbanked" city in the nation and
labeled the Illinois banking system as not only incomplete and
rigid but also unsuccessful in attracting savings or putting out
loans at lower rates. Branch banking's value was regarded as
"the most powerful method . . . [of] improving the supply of
bank services quickly and at the lowest cost to the community."66
If branch banking were allowed, service could be increased
for the public's benefit to improve on such conditions as found
in Holyoke. As the Illinois study indicates, the branch prohibition causes unusual charges by other non-bank entities. 67 Not
only can services provided by branch banking be less expensive,
they can also be much more convenient. This is especially
65 C.

COLLINS, THE BRANCH BANKING QUESTION 3

66

Bratter, supra note 2, at 92.

67

Id.

(1926).
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true for Colorado because of its changing population patterns,
a fact which will encourage the banks to open branches in the
growing suburbs. The increase in service gained by allowing
branches to coexist is summarized by a study conducted by the
New York State Banking Department which listed among the
beneficial effects of branch banking these positive points:
"lower loan rates, higher interest on savings deposits, more
liberal loan maturities and loan-value ratios, greater services
and banking facilities, larger lending authority and greater
' '6
convenience for the public.
Another facet of banking which may be improved by the
removal of branching prohibitions is the free transfer of funds
from one sector of the state to another. Presently, the method
used by unit banks to satisfy the needs of their customers with
large cash demands is to establish correspondent relations with
other banks. This arrangement requires that a substantial
amount of the liquidity funds of local banks be deposited with
the larger corresponding institution. This in turn causes a local
bank's excess liquidity reserves to be removed to the big money
centers where they often earn a lower return than possible
given other potential uses. The money centers profit from such
an arrangement at the expense of the local bank. This situation
would definitely be improved if branches could transfer funds
internally with "sister" branches without restraint. In the absence of branching restrictions, transfers could be based upon
present need rather than upon an automatic funneling of funds
to big business and big money centers.
A further advantage of branch banking is the manager's
potential freedom in determining local needs, an ability which
local unit bank managers lack because of their heavy dependence on the larger correspondent institutions for a final decision
on loans.
Not only would the branches achieve more local autonomy
and profits, but a local businessman who outgrows a small unit
bank's capabilities could continue to do business with a local
branch, instead of taking his business to a different region or
state. For example, in New Hampshire, where branching is
prohibited, bankers are showing concern over many growing
corporations transferring their business to larger banks in Boston.69 The fact that other means exist for promoting competition between large and small institutions, such as the promotion
68
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of group and chain banking, is aptly dismissed by James Saxon
who states that the existence of such alternatives is no justification for arbitrarily depriving the public of the benefits to be
derived from small unit banks directly competing with larger
70
unit banks and their branches.
The prohibition against branching also produces a vacuum,
created by unsatisfied financial demands, which institutions
other than commercial banks fill. Loan companies, credit unions,
industrial banks, savings and loan associations, private lenders,
and various federal agricultural credit agencies are the institutions which are supposedly filling this void at present. These
organizations are, however, not equipped to perform as efficiently the full range of services which commercial banks
offer.7 1 Furthermore, from the public's point of view, these
alternatives offer more costly and less efficient operations than
commercial banks. James Saxon has warned that unit banks
and their opposition to branch banking are directly responsible
for the growth of these non-banking institutions, a fact which
injures all segments of the commercial banking industry. Saxon
also feels that the regulation of branch banking lessens banking
efficiency and prevents the growth of banks both large and
7 2
small which are able to fill the varying needs of society.
An outgrowth of this dilemma has been the increase in
holding companies and chain banks. There is no doubt that
many bankers regard the multi-bank holding company or privately controlled chain bank as merely a technique to circumvent
7 3
branching restrictions, with no other purposes or advantages.
However, there are important differences between these alternatives and branch banking, especially concerning their capital
structures. Holding companies are basically a series of unit
banks with independent cash supplies; there is no free flow of
currency between the members of the company or chain. The
result requires holding company and chain banks to reside in
populous areas where they can profitably survive. Smaller communities, consequently, are deprived of the ready access of a
local bank. On the other hand, branches can be structured to be
as small as necessary and thereby operate successfully in suburban areas where unit banks, though owned by a holding com70
71

Hearings, supra note 52, at 556.
Saxon, Non-Branch Banking Policy -

A Formula for Stagnation, 197

COM. & FIN. CHRON. 1701, 1730 (April 25, 1963).
72 Id. at 1701.
73

Mascia, Banking Competition, Structure, and Regulation in New York
State, 212 CoM. & FIN. CHRON. 149, 159 (July 16, 1970).

BRANCH BANKING

pany, could not operate profitably. 74 Therefore, the prohibition
of branches not only deprives some areas of local banking, but
also encourages group and chain banking.
It can also be argued that economic growth is a benefit
derived from branching. Those states which have the most
fragmented banking--which include Colorado, even though
group and chain banking account for one-third of all banks and
two-thirds of all deposits7 5 - appear to show less economic
progress than those maintaining a favorable environment for
banking growth through branching. 76 This fact alone does not
indicate which phenomenon is the causative agent, but this may
be inferred from observing which states fragment banking by
prohibiting branching.
Most states which prohibit branches have predictable homogeneous economies which do not demand a funds flow system
necessary to satisfy diversified business population and seasonal
needs of varying areas. Most agricultural states are dominated
by stable businesses whose financial needs are not growing
quickly enough to lobby for more progressive regulatory systems. An example of this type of economy is Iowa, which is
noted for its predictable corn-hog cycle economy. Conversely,
California's free branching system reflects the population's and
industry's needs in an ever-changing environment. There, various demands on resources do not allow money to be restricted to
predictable agricultural seasons, and therefore dictate a more
flexible funds flow which is provided by a branching system.
The statistics verify the progressive nature of branch banking.
Five of the six states which had the greatest increase in per
capita income from 1957 to 1967 showed increases in their banking concentration. The six states with the lowest increase in
per capita income during the same period all had decreases in
banking concentration.77 Though admittedly either characteristic need not be dependent upon the other, these figures add
credibility to the arguments for branching when discussing the
future of Colorado's growing economy.
SUMMARY

Colorado needs more flexibility in its laws regarding branch
banking. The historical problems upon which today's laws are
based have become either obsolete through time or controlled
by new laws. There remain no valid reasons (other than Saxon's
74 D. ALHADEFF, supra note 57, 232.
75 See Colorado Section, POLK'S BANK DICTIONARY (1971).
76 Rose, supra note 1, at 142.
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selfish interests explanation7 8 ) for such restrictive laws to exist
under the guise of protecting the public. The public deserves
branch banking service. The economic needs of Coloradans,
coupled with the presently inefficient laws, are allowing the
less favorable alternatives to branch banking to fill the void
created by the present prohibition. These laws, when combined
with Colorado's unique control of commercial banks which allow
savings and loan associations to go unregulated, aggravate this
situation and point toward the need for immediate legislative
action on the subject of branch banking.
Moreover, the present statutory restrictions, if arbitrarily
continued, could be stripped of their foundation by changes in
the national banking system. The desire of the national system
for less stringent restrictions is explained by the former Comptroller of Currency, James Saxon, who, when discussing the
branching restrictions, remarked, "To withhold entirely any
means for reaching our national goals [of efficiency] is to court
the peril of failure - a failure we cannot afford in today's
world."7 9 It is therefore strongly urged that before the national
banking system is changed to eliminate the state's restrictions,
thus weakening the dual banking, Colorado's present laws be
updated to coincide with other states' modern concept of what
benefits the public.
James E. Heffer
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